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CORPORATE LAW
LEVEL OF CONDUCT ACTIONABLE UNDER THE
SOUTH CAROLINA BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A common-law principle of corporate jurisprudence for more than 165
years,I the business judgment rule precludes judicial review of the wisdom or
soundness of directors' carefully exercised business decisions2 and further
ensures that directors will not be held liable for "an honest mistake of business
judgment. "I Dispute exists, however, regarding what level of conduct remains
actionable in light of the business judgment rule. The South Carolina Supreme
Court in Dockside Ass'n v. Delyens4 held that "the business judgment rule
precludes judicial review of actions taken by a corporate governing board
absent a showing of a lack of good faith, fraud, self-dealing or unconscionable
conduct. "' The language of the South Carolina Court of Appeals in the more
recent case of Goddard v. Fairways Development General Partnership,6
however, implies that ordinary negligence is the applicable standard.' This
note attempts to resolve the issue by examining prior applications of the rule
in South Carolina courts.
South Carolina law provides a specific formulation of a director's
fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders.8 Utilizing a
1. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 78 (La. 1829) (stating that liability is imposed
on directors only when "the error of the agent is of so gross a kind that a man of common sense,
and ordinary attention, would not have fallen into it"); see, e.g., Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11
Ala. 191, 201 (1847) (holding directors of a bank not liable if "they acted in good faith, and with
a view to the promotion of the interest of the bank"); Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 140
A. 264, 267 (Del. 1927) (holding that "the discretion of a board of directors ... should not be
interferedwith, except for fraud, actual or constructive, such as impropermotive or personal gain
or arbitrary action or conscious disregard of the interests of the corporation and the rights of its
stockholders"); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312, 338 (1850) (stating that the
general rule "is that a director is liable only for ordinary care and prudence").
2. 2 SHERWOOD M. CLEVELAND ET AL., S.C. CORPORATE PRACTICE MANUAL § 24.09(2)(c)
(1989); see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986); HARRY G. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES § 234 (2d ed.
1970).
3. Bodell, 140 A. at 267.
4. 294 S.C. 86, 362 S.E.2d 874 (1987).
5. Id. at 87, 362 S.E.2d at 874 (citing Papalexiou v. Tower West Condominium, 401 A.2d
280, 285-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979)).
6. 310 S.C. 408, 426 S.E.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1993).
7. See id. at 414, 426 S.E.2d at 832 (holding that "the conduct of the directors should be
judged by the 'business judgment rule' and absent a showing of bad faith, dishonesty or
incompetence, the judgment of the directors will not be set aside by judicial action.").
8. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (providing that a "director shall
discharge his duties ... (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
1
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"traditional standard"9 dating to the nineteenth century,'0 general statutory
language dictates "the manner in which the director performs his duties.""
A director may breach this general standard of care by disregarding fundamen-
tal duties or by being inattentive.'2 Only when a director makes a conscious
decision, however, is application of the business judgment rule triggered.
Section 33-8-300 is not an attempt "to codify the business judgment rule;
" 13
rather, it is a broad statutory enactment that "leaves many questions open for
judicial resolution."1 Armed with the authority to fill in the gaps of a broad
statutory section with common-law principles relating to fiduciary duties, 5
the courts of South Carolina discussed the business judgment of the directors
in both Dockside and Goddard.
In Dockside the board of directors of a non-profit homeowners' associa-
tion declared that an emergency situation existed and levied an assessment
against the co-owners of the property. 6 The association's bylaws required
approval of sixty percent of the co-owners for assessments made to the
common elements of the property, "while. . . [assessments] made for
emergency expenditures require[d] approval by 51 per cent. "' When Detyens
and another co-owner, Burbic, "refused to pay the special assessment because
less than 60 per cent of the co-owners approved it,"8 the homeowners
association brought an action to foreclose liens for the unpaid amount.
In upholding the association's determination that an emergency situation
existed, the court of appeals relied on Papalexiou v. Tower West Condomini-
um, 19 a factually similar case. In Papalexiou a majority of the board of
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders").
9. E. Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The BusinessJudgment Rule in the Revised Model
Act, the Trans Union Case, and the ALI Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1483,
1493 (1985).
10. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (determining that bank directors must
act as "ordinarily prudent and diligent men ... under similar circumstances, and in determining
that ... the usages of business should be taken into account").
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300 official comment (Law. Co-op. 1990).
12. See, e.g., Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 236 S.C. 318, 114 S.E.2d 321
(1960) (finding directors liable for inattention and for negligent supervision of officers); Baker
v. Mutual Loan & Inv. Co., 213 S.C. 558, 50 S.E.2d 692 (1948) (finding directors liable for
wrongful payment of dividends resulting from inattentiveness).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300 official comment (Law. Co-op. 1990).
14. 2 CLEVELAND, supra note 2, § 24.09(2)(a).
15. See id.
16. Dockside Ass'n v. Detyens, 291 S.C. 214, 215, 352 S.E.2d 714, 715 (Ct. App.), aff'd,
294 S.C. 86, 362 S.E.2d 874 (1987).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 401 A.2d 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979).
2
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trustees of a condominium association determined that a financial emergency
existed and levied a $100,000 assessment against the condominium owners.
The bylaws prohibited the board of trustees from spending more than $5000
without approval of a majority of the owners unless an emergency existed. The
plaintiffs, several unit owners, argued that an emergency did not exist and that
the assessment was therefore invalid because the board did not obtain the
approval of a majority of the owners.' In upholding the board's determina-
tion, the New Jersey court stated that "[c]ourts will not second-guess the
actions of directors unless it appears that they are the result of fraud,
dishonesty or incompetence."2" The South Carolina Court of Appeals adopted
this logic.'
In Goddard,23 the owners of four units in a planned unit development
(PUD) brought an action against the developer and the homeowners'
association to dissolve the development. A "Declarations of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions" (Declarations) governed the PUD. The Declara-
tions called for mandatory membership in the association by each villa owner
and required the homeowners' association to own and maintain the common
areas of the development. Furthermore, the Declarations required the consent
of 90% of the villa owners for amendment and the consent of 100% of the
villa owners for dissolution.24 The PUD gave superior voting rights to the
developer,21 who determined that assessments should be made against lots,
not parcels; therefore, only the six owners paid assessments, and these funds
were "inadequate to maintain the common areas."2 The plaintiffs proposed
that the developer pay assessments according to its voting power or that the
PUD be dissolved and title to the common areas be transferred to the owners.
The developer refused to pay assessments other than on the one lot it owned,
and the plaintiffs could not force the PUD's dissolution because of the
unanimous-vote requirement.27 The court of appeals referred to its own
opinion in Dockside and stated: "We cannot say that under the circumstances
20. Id. at 282-83.
21. Id. at 286.
22. Dockside, 291 S.C. at 217, 352 S.E.2d at 716.
23. 310 S.C. 408, 426 S.E.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1993).
24. Id. at 410, 426 S.E.2d at 830.
25. Note 1 of the court's opinion states:
Article III of the Declarations creates two classes of voting rights in the Associa-
tion. Class "A" is all "Owners" except the Developer; they have one vote for each
"Lot" owned. Class "B" is the Developer; it has 50 votes for each "Lot" owned, and
a total of 1500 votes for the existing "Parcels." As each "Parcel" is subdivided, the
Developer receives 50 votes for each resulting "Lot." This class system continues
until the number of Class A votes equals the number of Class B votes.
Id. at 410 n.1, 426 S.E.2d at 830 n.1.
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of this case the [defendants] violated a fiduciary duty to the [plaintiffs] by not
voting for higher assessments."
28
Considering Dockside and Goddard did not actually penetrate the issue,
the question remains: What level of conduct is actionable under the business
judgment rule in South Carolina? In at least one instance,29 the South
Carolina Supreme Court has been willing to look to the case law of Delaware,
"the Mother Court of corporate law," 30 for guidance in the area of corporate
jurisprudence. The Delaware and the South Carolina versions of the business
judgment rule are similar in substance, and both contain duties of loyalty and
care. 3 Because a South Carolina court would probably look to Delaware case
law again for guidance, a summary of the relevant law concerning the business
judgment rule in Delaware is appropriate.
In Aronson v. Lewis32 plaintiff Lewis brought a shareholder derivative
suit against Meyers Parking System and its board of directors. Lewis alleged
that certain transactions between the board and one of its directors, Fink, were
improper and were only approved because Fink "personally selected each
director and officer of Meyers. "3 At issue was an employment contract that
Lewis claimed wasted corporate assets, had no valid business purpose, and
was grossly excessive.34 In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, the
court defined the business judgment rule as "a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company. "3 The court went on to state that to take advantage
of the rule, directors "have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a
business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them."36
Basing its definition of requisite care "upon concepts of gross negligence," the
court explained further that, once directors have adequately informed
themselves, they must "act with requisite care in the discharge of their
28. Id. at 414, 426 S.E.2d at 832.
29. Santee Oil Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975).
30. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
31. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990), with Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
32. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
33. Id. at 808.
34. See id. at 809. The contract at issue paid Fink $150,000 per year plus five per cent of net
profits above a stated amount. When Fink retired, the contract required him to become a
consultant, with payment of $150,000 for the first three years, $125,000 for the next three years,
and $100,000 each year thereafter for life. The board also approved interest-free loans totaling
$225,000 to Fink. At the time of the contract, Fink was seventy-five years old. Id. at 808-09.
35. Id. at 812.
36. Id.
4
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duties." 37 The Aronson court noted that although the courts of Delaware had
not precisely identified a director's standard of liability, precedents pointed
towards a standard "less exacting than simple negligence."31
The very next year the Delaware Supreme Court handed down a much-
criticized39 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.40 In Van Gorkom, the chief
executive officer and chairman of Trans Union Corporation, Jerome Van
Gorkom, privately negotiated a $55-per-share, cash-out merger with Jay
Pritzker of the Marmon Group. For the offer to remain open, however,
Pritzker demanded that Trans Union's board of directors "act on his merger
proposal within the next three days."41 The next day Van Gorkom called a
special meeting of the board 2 and made a twenty-minute presentation of
Pritzker's offer that included neither a valuation study nor physical merger
documents for the board to review. 43 Based upon Van Gorkom's presentation,
the representations of Trans Union's president and its chief financial officer,
and the advice of outside counsel, the board approved the merger. At the next
board meeting some two weeks later, the directors blindly approved amend-
ments made to Pritzker's offer. Two and one-half months later, the board met
and gave its final approval to the cash-out merger first proposed by Van
Gorkom. 4
The trial court in Van Gorkom upheld the board's actions, finding that the
board had sufficient time between Van Gorkom's initial presentation and the
board's approval some three months later to acquire "sufficient information to
reach an informed business judgment on the cash-out merger proposal."' s
The supreme court, however, reversed and found the directors personally
liable. The court focused on the process the board undertook in reaching its
decision and held that the board's decision was not an informed business
judgment. The court further held that the board's efforts to amend the
37. Id.
38. Id. at 812 n.6.
39. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 894 (Del. 1985) (MeNeilly, J., dissenting)
(calling the majority's opinion a "comedy of errors"); Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAw. 1437, 1455 (1985) (calling the case "one of the
worst decisions in the history of corporate law"); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical
Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1985) ("The Delaware
Supreme Court in Van Gorkom exploded a bomb.").
40. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
41. Id. at 867.
42. The directors had one day's notice of the meeting and were not told its purpose. Only
Trans Union's controller (Peterson) and its president and chief operating officer (Chelberg) knew
the meeting's purpose. Moreover, Trans Union's investment banker, Salomon Brothers, was not
invited. Id.
43. Id. at 867-68.
44. Id. at 869-70.
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agreement were ineffectual and that the board did not deal with the stockhold-
ers in a frank and forthright manner.46 The Van Gorkom court stated that
fulfillment of a director's duty "requires more than the mere absence of bad
faith or fraud. "I Reaffirming its holding in Aronson, the court stated that
"the concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard for determining
whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed
one."
48
Despite the outrage of some commentators at the result reached in Van
Gorkom,49 a South Carolina court faced with the same set of facts found by
the Delaware court would probably reach a comparable result. The Van
Gorkom court merely held that, as fiduciaries, directors must inform
themselves, "'prior to making a business decision, of all material information
reasonably available to them.' "" This duty to become informed is not
expressly stated in South Carolina's formulation of a director's duty of care;
however, such a duty has been implied by the South Carolina Supreme Court
in at least one instance."'
In response to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van Gorkom,
the Delaware Legislature in 1986 enacted a statute that authorizes stockholders
to adopt charter provisions that limit the liability of directors to the corporation
or its stockholders.5" In 1988 the South Carolina General Assembly followed
Delaware's initiative and enacted a similar measure.13 This section may
negatively imply that, absent any provision to the contrary in a corporation's
articles, "the usual standard for liability in South Carolina is ordinary
negligence" ;54 however, this does not appear to be the case. Provisions
46. Id. at 864.
47. Id. at 872.
48. Id. at 873.
49. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
50. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984)).
51. Baker v. Mutual Loan & Inv. Co., 213 S.C. 558, 50 S.E.2d 692 (1948). Here, the court
stated that the directors of an investment company had a "duty to inform themselves of the
condition of the company which could not be discharged by shuttingtheir eyes and blindly relying
on any statement made by" someone who was neither a director nor an officer of the corporation.
Id. at 566, 50 S.E.2d at 695. But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300(b) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
52. Although specifically preventing a limitation of liability for "acts or omissions not in good
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law," this section
allows a corporation to include in its articles of incorporation a provision that eliminates or limits
the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for a director's breach
of his fiduciary duties. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (Supp. 1994).
53. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-2-102(e) (Law. Co-op. 1990). This section, however, does not
allow the articles of incorporation to include a provision that limits a director's liability for "acts
or omissions... which involve gross negligence."S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-2-102(e)(ii) (Law. Co-
op. 1990).
54. 2 CLEVELAND, supra note 2, at § 24.09(3).
6
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placed in a corporation's articles of incorporation pursuant to similar director
protection statutes "are now common in corporate affairs."" Furthermore,
these same provisions undeniably "shield directors from breaches of the duty
of care."56 Cases applying the business judgment rule since the enactment of
section 102(b)(7) in Delaware have continued to apply a gross negligence
standard.
5 7
Thus, Aronson remains the law in Delaware: "[U]nder the business
judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negli-
gence."" Perhaps adding clarity to the rule, another Delaware court has
stated: "In the corporate context, gross negligence means 'reckless indifference
to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders' or actions
which are 'without the bounds of reason.' "" The courts of South Carolina
have relied on Delaware for guidance concerning corporate matters in the past.
Furthermore, both states have similar attitudes concerning the limited liability
of directors, and both states have similarly construed the nature of directors'
fiduciary duties to a corporation and its shareholders. Application of the
business judgment rule in South Carolina, therefore, should be no different.
M. Saylor Sims
55. Stroud v. Grace, 1990 WL 176803, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
56. Zim v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 783 (Del. 1993).
57. See In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litig., 642 A.2d 792 (Del. Ch.), aff'd sub nom.
Sea-Land Corp. Shareholder Litig. v. Abely, 633 A.2d 371 (Del. 1993) (citing Van Gorkom and
holding that in a corporate acquisition context "[t]he standard for determining whether a board
decision was sufficiently informed is gross negligence"); Citron v. Fairchild Camera &
Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989) (quoting Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873, for the
proposition that "[tihe standard for determining 'whether a business judgment reached by a board
of directors was an informed one' is gross negligence"); Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518
(Del. 1987). Jardel was a civil suit by a mall employee against the mall's owner alleging failure
to provide adequate security. Id. at 521-22. The court cited Aronson and stated that "[tihe concept
of gross negligence continues to find application as a recovery threshold in cases of corporate
director liability under the business judgment rule." Id. at 530.
58. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See also Moran v. Household Int'l,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) ("To determine whether a business judgment reached by
a board of directors was an informed one, we determine whether the directors were grossly
negligent."); E. Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or
Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law,
35 Bus. LAw. 919, 928 (1980) ("The language of other Delaware cases supports the conclusion
that the Delaware standard is gross negligence.").
59. Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990)
(quoting Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch.), aft'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974);
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